Introduction
The effects of zoning on land and housing markets in the United States have been the subject of considerable analysis by urban planners, sociologists and economists: and for good reasons. After the model planning and zoning enabling acts were prepared by 438 ARNAB CHAkRABORTy et al. zoning exacerbates the problem of affordable housing, serves to exclude racial and ethnic minorities, and contributes to the problem of urban sprawl. For these reasons, the topic of zoning warrants continuing and increasingly better theoretical and empirical analysis.
Economists have long viewed zoning as an instrument with potentially adverse social and economic effects, but for a number of reasons empirical support for this view remains underdeveloped. First, much of the research on the effects of zoning by economists focuses on land and housing prices. While this body of work demonstrates that zoning can make housing less affordable, it provides only indirect evidence that zoning affects the rate and location of housing construction. Secondly, much of the empirical research on zoning treats zoning as exogenous. This assumption simplifies econometric analysis, but can lead to biased results and precludes analysis of what factors affect zoning decisions by local governments. Finally, because zoning ordinances and codes adopted by local governments vary extensively, good data on zoning from multiple jurisdictions are difficult to obtain. As a result, most empirical studies tend to focus on single jurisdictions or use extremely coarse measures of zoning constraints.
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the effects of zoning on multifamily housing construction from 1990 to 2000 in 144 suburbs of six metropolitan areas. Zoning constraints are measured as the total number of high-density units allowed by right in each suburban jurisdiction obtained from local zoning ordinances and geographical information system (GIS) data. Using twostage least squares, the analysis provides two important insights: zoning as practised by suburban governments in the six metropolitan areas limits the construction of multifamily housing below market determined levels; and, multifamily zoning constraints are not exogenous but vary systematically with distance from the central city and with the racial composition of community in 1960.
Previous Research
The empirical literature on zoning is voluminous and for the purposes of this paper can be organised into three sets. The first and by far the largest set addresses the effects of zoning on land and housing prices using hedonic price estimation. This literature has been reviewed several times including, most recently, by Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) . Although this body of research provides compelling evidence that zoning can have adverse effects on housing affordability, the approach has several limitations. First, because zoning is everywhere a local prerogative, most of this research uses data from a single municipality or metropolitan area, making results difficult to generalise. The few studies that are regional or national in scope use very coarse measures of zoning restrictions, such as the results of surveys (Malpezzi, 1996) , indexes (Mayer and Somerville, 2000) or density ceilings (Pendall, 2000) . Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, studies showing that land use regulations increase land or housing values cannot identify whether regulations cause prices to rise as a result of amenity creation or artificial supply constraints (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1994) . Finally, hedonic price analyses do not provide information about housing starts or housing density, thus they are unable to ascertain the direct effects of zoning on housing supplies or development densities.
Another limitation of hedonic analysis, addressed by only a few hedonic price studies, is that zoning is endogenous. That is, zoning is not a policy instrument imposed on local governments, but is the outcome of a political process shaped in part by some of the characteristics that zoning is thought to affect-for example, the fiscal health and demographic make-up of the community. This introduces econometric complexities because the error 439 term in an ordinary least squares estimate is correlated with the zoning variable of interest. The econometric solution to this problem is to use two-stage least squares, three-stage least squares, or a sample selection term to capture the endogeneity of zoning (Pogodzinski and Sass, 1994) .
The determinants of zoning decisions have been the subject of empirical inquiry since the seminal work of Davis (1963) . In general, zoning is thought to be motivated by one of three objectives: to minimise externalities between land uses, to attract development with favourable fiscal impacts and to exclude low-income residents or minorities. There is evidence to support all three views. Wallace (1988) and McMillen and McDonald (1989 , 1990 , 1991a , 1991b , 1991c account for selection bias by incorporating the locational and topographic determinants of zoning. Rolleston (1987) and Erickson and Wollover (1987) emphasise the demographic determinants of zoning. Cervero and Duncan (2004) find racial diversity to lower property values and zoning policies to be marketsensitive. Support for racial exclusion as a motivation for zoning is offered by Pendall (2000) , who argues that low-density zoning in particular serves to exclude minority populations via a 'chain of exclusion' . Finally, Pogodzinski and Sass (1994) find evidence that zoning decisions are consistent with externality, fiscal and exclusionary motives.
The literature on the effects of zoning and land use regulations directly on housing construction is less voluminous. Shen (1996) analysed the impacts of local growth controls on population distributions in the San Francisco Bay area with and without growth controls using a quasi-experimental approach. He found that local growth controlsincluding measures of zoning restrictions and density controls obtained via phone interviews of planners-caused a deflection of growth from growth-controlled jurisdictions to the outer edges of the region. Malpezzi (1996) analysed the effects of land use regulations on housing prices and starts in 55 US metropolitan areas. He found that regulations-measured as an index of state and local land use instruments obtained from a variety of sources-increase housing prices and reduce housing starts. Levine (1999) analysed the effects of local growth controls on housing production and population distributions in California. He found that local growth controls-measured as an index of local growth control instruments obtained via a survey-displaced new construction from growth-controlled communities to interior areas of California with particularly adverse impacts on low-income and minority residents. Ihlanfeldt (2004) , in his review of related studies, notes that, on the question of exclusionary regulations contributing to income or racial segregation, past studies have not accounted for endogeneity of restrictiveness of regulations. Thorson (1997) analysed the impacts of zoning on housing construction in McHenry County, Illinois. He found that down-zoning minimum lot sizes from 5 to 160 acres in the agricultural zones of the county significantly reduced the number of new building permits issued after a lagged period. Of all these studies, only the latter used a direct measure of zoning restrictiveness rather than a zoning index or survey response; none of these studies addressed the possible endogeneity of zoning.
Three previous studies warrant particular attention for the purposes of this paper. Pendall (2000) examined the effects of local land use regulation on housing stocks, tenure and affordability, and on the racial composition of 1000 jurisdictions in the 25 largest US metropolitan areas. His measures of local land use regulations include low-density zoning, jurisdiction boundaries, development moratoria, permit caps, urban growth boundaries and adequate public facilities ordinances obtained via a survey of local planners. Estimating a sequence of regression equations, Pendall finds that low-density zoning lowers housing production, causes a shift towards single-family housing, lowers the percentage of rental units and rental affordability, and results in the exclusion of racial minorities. Pendall's study provides compelling evidence that low-density zoning has a number of adverse effects on housing markets and minority residents. His measure of low-density zoning, however-a survey response on whether the average zoned density in the entire jurisdiction is more than eight units per acre-is highly imprecise. He also does not address the potential endogeneity of zoning.
Mayer and Somerville (2000) examine the effects of land use regulation on residential construction in 44 US metropolitan areas from 1985 to 1996. Their measures of land use regulation are the same as Malpezzi's (1996) , based on surveys conducted by Linneman and Summers (1993) , and include the time needed for sub-division approval, the number of growth management techniques and the use of development impact fees. They find that metropolitan areas with more restrictive regulatory environments can have up to 45 per cent fewer starts and a price elasticity of supply more than 20 per cent lower than those in less restrictive environments. Although their measure of regulatory restrictiveness is a crude aggregate of regulations imposed by all jurisdictions in a metropolitan area, they are able to test for the endogeneity of the regulatory index. Using instrumental variables, they find that regulations continue to have strong negative effects on housing starts, but that the effect is much larger after accounting for the endogeneity of the regulations themselves. Glaeser et al. (2006) examine the effects of regulations on housing prices and starts in the Boston metropolitan area from 1980 to 2000. The Glaeser et al. study differs from most previous studies in that the data on regulatory restrictiveness come from official government documents, interviews with local officials and precise measures of zoning density computed using GIS. Specifically, Glaeser et al. measure zoned density as a weighted average of allowed density (where the weights equal total acres in each zone) in each residential zone in the jurisdiction. They then use this measure to estimate the impacts of zoning on single-family and multifamily housing prices and starts. Further, to address the potential endogeneity of zoning, they include a number of exogenous variables, including distance to the CBD, the percentage of manufacturing jobs in 1940 and the minority share of population in 1940. Then using OLS, they find that, when average minimum lot size increases by one-quarter of an acre, approximately 10 per cent fewer houses were built between 1980 and 2000. They also find that the reduction in housing construction had significant impacts on regional housing prices, perhaps increasing median prices by as much as 23 to 36 per cent. Because their data are limited to the Boston metropolitan area, however, the generalisability of their results is limited.
Data
Our objective was to collect high-quality data on zoning from multiple jurisdictions in multiple metropolitan areas. To select areas of study, we first collected data on the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the US, seeking study areas that were diverse with respect to rates of growth, regulatory environments, housing prices and rents, and regional location. We then contacted regional government officials to collect information about the availability of GIS data and the likelihood of local co-operation. This narrowed the pool dramatically. Metropolitan-wide zoning data in GIS format were available for only two metropolitan areas: Portland and Boston.
For other projects, we already had zoning data in GIS format for Miami-Dade County and for the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. For Minneapolis-St Paul and Sacramento, metropolitan-wide data were available on comprehensive plan designations, but not on zoning. Thus we focused our study on these six metropolitan areas: Boston, Massachusetts; Miami-Dade County, Florida: Minneapolis-St Paul, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Sacramento, California; and Washington, DC.
We make no claims that these six metropolitan areas are prototypical or representative of all metropolitan areas in the US. We do claim, however, that these six metropolitan areas offer a range of regulatory environmentsincluding environments based on traditional zoning (Boston), concurrency requirements and impact fees (Miami) and comprehensive growth controls (Portland) . We also claim that a careful quantitative and qualitative analysis of zoning and development patterns in these metropolitan areas offer insights on the effects of zoning across the nation heretofore not previously available.
To derive indicators of zoning constraints, we obtained copies of current local zoning ordinances, comprehensive plans and GIS data that contained zoning and comprehensive plan designations for all land in each jurisdiction. We then computed, for each jurisdiction with land use authority in each study area, acres of land zoned for singlefamily, multifamily, commercial, industrial, public use/open space and mixed use. Then, using only acres zoned for residential or mixed use, we computed for each jurisdiction the maximum number of residential units allowed by zoning
where, ZHU = maximum number of housing units allowed by zoning in each jurisdiction; UPA i = maximum number units allowed on one acre in zone i; 1 and ACRES i = number of acres in the jurisdiction zoned for residential use i.
The maximum number of units allowed by right in each jurisdiction was classified into two groups: low density and high density. Low-density zones limit development to less than 8 units per acre; high-density zones permit development at or above 8 units per acre. The primary variable of interest in this study, ZHDHU, is the maximum number of high-density units allowed by right in each jurisdiction.
To identify the effects of high-density zoning on multifamily housing construction, we also collected data from the US Census Bureau for the years 1960, 1990 and 2000. Our choice of 1960 variables was based on our review of Glaeser et al.'s (2006) study of the Boston area where they use, among other variables, the percentage minority in 1940. We choose a later date of 1960, as the earliest census (including Census of Governments revenue and expenditure) data when most of the towns and municipalities in our study areas were incorporated and had roughly the same boundaries as in 2000. To explore the determinants of zoning constraints, we obtained for each jurisdiction in approximately 1960, information about racial composition, household incomes, education, local government revenues and local government expenditures.
2 To examine the effects of zoning on multifamily housing construction, we obtained for each jurisdiction in 1980 and 1990 a variety of demographic variables, including population and income, as well as data on multifamily housing stocks. Descriptive statistics are presented in the appendix (Table A1) .
Although the dataset we obtained is perhaps one of the most detailed ever collected on local zoning restrictions in multiple metropolitan areas, it has a number of limitations. First, because GIS zoning data were not available for jurisdictions in Minneapolis-St Paul and Sacramento, we used comprehensive plan designations for those jurisdictions. Comprehensive plan designations are often less precise but can provide a better representation of future land use. Secondly, our measure of maximum units allowed by zoning is still somewhat imprecise. Our measure captures gross units and does not exclude land needed for roads, parks, public easements, etc. Further, because our measure is in many cases taken from a regional generalisation of local zoning codes, the upper limit of the range of allowed zoning densities may overstate actual allowed densities.
3 Our zoning data and housing construction data also do not come from the same period. Our zoning data measure the allowed number of units when the data were obtained (approximately while the census data measure housing and demographic changes from 1990 to 2000. It is reasonable to expect that our zoning data capture the general constraints imposed by zoning during the 1990s, but they represent an imprecise measure of such constraints. Finally, the dependent variable in our analysis, the change in the number of multifamily housing units over the period from 1990 to 2000, is not defined in the same terms as our central independent variable, zoned high-density housing units. Although it is possible that multifamily housing units are developed at less than eight units per acre, it is probably rare. It is also possible that single-family housing is developed at densities greater than eight units per acre, but it is also rare even though it could be less rare than in the case of multifamily housing.
Analysis and Results
The focus of this study is on the construction of multifamily housing. Thus we estimate an equation in which changes in the stock of multifamily housing is a function of changes in variables that shape the demand for multifamily housing and potential constraints on supply-in particular, zoning constraints. 4 Our primary regression equation can thus be expressed as follows
where, DMHU = change in multifamily housing units, 1990 to 2000; X90 = a vector of demographic characteristics in 1990; DX = a vector of changes in demographic characteristics from 1990 to 2000; D = a vector of metropolitan-specific dummy variables; Portland = 0; and HDZHU = number of highdensity housing units allowed by zoning.
To address the potential endogeneity of zoning, we use two-stage least squares in addition to ordinary least squares estimation. As instruments for zoning, we use variables that capture the racial composition of the jurisdiction, as well as local government revenues and expenditures in approximately 1960. To explore the determinants of zoning, we also estimate a zoning equation of the following form
where, F60 = a vector of fiscal variables; X60 = a vector of demographic characteristics of the community in 1960; and DCBD = distance to the central business district. The results of a number of alternative specifications are presented in Tables 1 and 2 . Overall, the results generally follow expectations and are relatively robust across specifications. As shown in Table 1 , the change in the number of multifamily housing units is strongly related to changes in demographic characteristics from 1990 to 2000. 5 As expected, growth in the number of multifamily housing units is strongly and positively affected by growth in population and growth in the share of the population that is foreign-born. Also as expected, growth in multifamily housing is negatively related to growth in household incomes in four of the six specifications. The effects of zoning on growth in multifamily housing construction is positive in every specification but in all cases relatively small. For every 100 units of multifamily housing allowed by zoning, only two to eight new housing units were constructed between 1990 and 2000. Further, the effect of zoning on multifamily housing construction is significant only when using two-stage least squares. 6 This occurs both because the size of the coefficient increases in the two-stage least squares model and because the standard error falls. Most importantly, however, these results suggest that zoning is indeed endogenous and that failure to capture the endogeneity of zoning can lead to an underestimation of its effects.
The results of models used to predict zoning are presented in Table 2 . As shown, the number of units zoned for high-density development is not significantly affected by total public revenues or expenditures in 1957. Zoning also does not appear to be affected Notes : ** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Sources : COG (1957); US Census (1960, 1990 and 2000) ; Census TIGER files (2000). Notes : ** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Sources : COG (1957); US Census (1960, 1990 and 2000) ; Census TIGER files (2000).
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by the income or education levels of the community in 1960. Zoning does, however, appear to be strongly affected by the racial composition of the community in 1960 and by the distance of the community from the central business district. As suggested by urban economic theory, the number of units zoned for high-density development falls with distance from the central city. And following the results of Pendall and others, the number of units zoned for high-density development is lower in communities that are more predominantly White. Finally, after controlling for community size, only the Washington metropolitan area has more units zoned for high-density development than metropolitan Portland. Many additional exogenous variables were considered while constructing this equation, including more recent fiscal conditions and the monopoly zoning hypothesis (number of local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area as a determinant of monopoly power (Thorson, 1997) ). Our selection of past fiscal condition was based on the understanding that earlier fiscal conditions, when a higher proportion of land in these jurisdictions was greenfield, is a better indicator, something our robust results support. Also, we included the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area as a variable in column 6 of Table 2 and found little evidence that more monopoly power restricts housing production, consistent with Thorson's conclusion. We were left with the distance to the central business district and the percentage of White population in 1960 (column 6, Table 2 ) as instrumental variables for the number of high-density housing units allowed by zoning.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the effects of high-density zoning on the construction of multifamily housing units in suburban jurisdictions of six metropolitan areas. Using data on changes in multifamily housing stocks and on the number of units allowed by right in high-density zones, we found, using two-stage least squares, that suburban jurisdictions with more units zoned, or designated, for high-density development have greater increases in their multifamily housing stocks. Further, we found that the number of units zoned, or designated, for high-density development in a suburban jurisdiction is in part determined by the proximity of the jurisdiction to the central business district and by the racial composition of the jurisdiction in 1960. These results have a number of importation implications. First, from a methodological perspective, we confirm the proposition that zoning is endogenous and that estimating the effects of zoning without addresses such endogeneity can produce misleading results. More importantly, we find that zoning in part reflects market forces. That is, the number of units zoned for high-density development declines with distance from the CBD just as urban economic theory would predict. This suggests that zoning decisions are not purely political decisions but are shaped, at least in part, by market considerations. We also find, however, that zoning reflects the racial composition of the jurisdiction in 1960. It is possible to infer from these results that zoning is perhaps a tool used for racial exclusion. It is also possible, however, to interpret these results as a reflection that the racial composition of the jurisdiction in 1960 is a marker for the type of community the jurisdiction would become 30 years later. That is, jurisdictions that had low proportions of racial minorities in the 1960s became jurisdictions with low-density and high-priced housing. And it is the character of the community that government officials use zoning to protect, rather than to exclude minorities per se. This is an important question that deserves further analysis. However, our results add to the mounting evidence that race has been a motivating factor behind the adoption of low-density zoning.
The finding that zoning impedes the development of multifamily housing in suburbs across the country also has important policy implications. For advocates of affordable housing, the results confirm suspicions that zoning contributes to the problem of housing affordability. Not only does zoning restrict the supply of housing in general, thus increasing housing prices over all, but zoning also restricts the supply of the most affordable type of housing and thus probably has a disproportionate effect on low-income residents. For advocates of smart growth and sustainable urban development, the results also confirm that zoning contributes to urban sprawl. By impeding the development of multifamily housing, zoning almost certainly lowers overall development densities and causes metropolitan areas to expand beyond market-determined levels.
For a number of reasons, constraints imposed by zoning have adverse social consequences and this begs a policy response. The classical policy prescription given by economists and advocates of market solutions is to limit the practice of zoning. Even if this were politically possible, such a policy prescription ignores the potential benefits that zoning offers as a land use policy instrument-e.g., reducing externalities and serving to implement a coherent comprehensive plan. For these reasons, we recommend instead oversight of zoning by a regional government. The role a regional government can play ranges from imposing minimum density requirements, providing incentives for high-density development, to simply providing information about zoning practices of jurisdictions in the region. The fact that Portland had the highest rate of multifamily housing development of the six metropolitan areas, and where Metro the regional government performs all of these functions, suggests that such a role for regional governments is worth a try.
Notes
1. If a range, we used the upper end-point of the range. 2. If the community did not exist in 1960, we used data for the entire unincorporated area of the county. 3. If, for example, the local zoning code allowed 3-5 units per acre, and the regional government classified this code into a regional code that permits 3-6 units per acre, we would have coded the maximum to be 6 units per acre, even though the local zoning only allows a maximum of 5 units per acre. 4. Note that we use the number of units allowed by zoning, not the change in the number of units allowed by zoning or land available, for three reasons: first, we have no way of measuring the number of units allowed in 1990 (hence no way to assess change or availability); secondly, it is likely that number of units allowed is a better measure of regulatory restrictiveness than the change in the number of units allowed over the decade; and, thirdly, as many studies (Thorson, 1994 (Thorson, , 1997 Avin and Bayer, 2003) indicate, change in zoning and its effect are limited when measured at the jurisdiction level. 5. We experimented with demographic characteristics of the population in 1990 and their changes from 1990 to 2000 and found that the change in number of multifamily housing units is more strongly related to changes in demographic variables. So, in the final models, we use change in percentage of African Americans, change in percentage of foreign-born and change in percentage of population over 65 as independent variables. 6. The zoning variable in the last IV equation is not significant but is very close. 7. COG is the Department of Commerce's Census of Governments; Census is US Census Bureau; Census Tiger files are US Census Bureau's Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing system. 8. We include all of 150 jurisdictions, including central cities in this model to predict zoning. Note : *** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).
